Russian irredentism

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  Russia and its territorial possessions throughout the Imperial (1721–1917) and the Soviet era (1922–1991), excluding Russian America (1741–1867)
  Soviet/post-Soviet territories that were never part of Imperial Russia: Tuva (1944–), East Prussia (1945–), western Ukraine (1939–1991), and Kuril Islands (1945–)
  Imperial territories/states that did not become part of the Soviet Union: Finland (1809–1917), Poland (1815–1915), and Kars (1878–1918)
  Soviet sphere of influence: Warsaw Pact (1945–1991; Albania until 1968; East Germany until 1990), Mongolia (1924–1991)
  Imperial sphere of influence and Soviet military occupation: northern Iran (1914–1918; 1941–1946), Manchuria (1892–1906; 1945–1946), northern Korea (1892–1906; 1945–1948), Xinjiang (1934), eastern Austria (1945–1955), and Afghanistan (1979–1989)

Russian irredentism (Russian: Русский ирредентизм), also expressed as Greater Russia (Великая Россия), refers to territorial claims made by the Russian Federation to territories that were historically part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, which Russian nationalists refer to as the "Russian world". It seeks to politically incorporate ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in neighbouring territories outside Russia's modern-day borders. This ideology has been significantly defined by the regime of Vladimir Putin, who has governed the country since 1999.

Russian troops currently occupy parts of three neighbouring countries: southern and eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the Transnistria region of Moldova. Since it began in 2014, the Russo-Ukrainian War has been described by much of the international community as being a culmination of Russia's irredentist policies towards Ukraine. Examples of these irredentist policies being implemented in this conflict include the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014[1] and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, which saw the Russian annexation of southeastern Ukraine in 2022.

Ideological background[edit]

Specifically looking at the viewpoints of post-Soviet Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Erdi Ozturk, a professor at London Metropolitan University, has commented that irredentist ideology relies upon a "distinction between civilizations by synthesizing nationalism with nostalgic visions of history, memory, and religion."[2]

History[edit]

Imperial era[edit]

From roughly the 16th century to the 20th century, the Russian Empire followed an expansionist policy.[n 1] Few of these actions had irredentist justifications, though the conquest of parts of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus in 1877 to bring Armenian Christians under the protection of the Tsar may represent one example.[3] Russia has also had a historical interest in Constantinople (Istanbul).

Post-Soviet era[edit]

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was thought that the Russian Federation had given up on plans of territorial expansion or kin-state nationalism, despite some 25 million ethnic Russians living in neighboring countries outside Russia.[4] Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres assert that Russia followed a non-irredentist policy in the 1990s despite some justifications for irredentist policies—one factor disfavoring irredentism was a focus by the ruling interest in consolidating power and the economy within the territory of Russia.[5] Furthermore, a stable policy of irredentism popular with the electorate was not found, and politicians proposing such ideas did not fare well electorally.[6] Russian nationalist politicians tended to focus on internal threats (i.e. "outsiders") rather than on the interests of Russians outside the federation.[7]

Russo-Ukrainian War (since 2014)[edit]

A Russian propaganda mural in occupied Yevpatoria in 2021 celebrating "Crimean spring"
Ukrainian regions wholly or largely claimed by Russia since 2014 (Crimea) and 2022 (Donbas, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia)

"Russia's border doesn't end anywhere".

—Vladimir Putin, 24 November 2016[8]

It has been proposed that the annexation of Crimea in 2014 proves Russia's adherence to irredentism today.[9][10][11][12] After the event in Crimea, the Transnistrian authorities requested Russia to annex Transnistria.[13][14][15]

The annexation of Crimea led to a new wave of Russian nationalism, with large parts of the Russian far right movement aspiring to annex even more land from Ukraine, including the unrecognized Novorossiya.[16] Analyst Vladimir Socor proposed that Russian president Vladimir Putin's speech after the annexation of Crimea was a de facto "manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism".[17] After international sanctions were imposed against Russia in early 2014, within a year the "Novorossiya" project was suspended: on 1 January 2015, the founding leadership announced the project has been put on hold, and on 20 May the constituent members announced the freezing of the political project.[18][19]

In July 2021, the Office of the President of Russia published an essay by Vladimir Putin, "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", in which he called Ukraine "historically Russian lands" and claimed there is "no historical basis" for the "idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians".[20][21]

On 21 February 2022, the Kremlin recognized the Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine as independent states—the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic—as well as their irredentist claims to the Donbas region of Ukraine. The following day, Russia announced that it was sending troops into these territories.[22][23]

Full-scale invasion of Ukraine (since 2022)[edit]

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine,[24] which is seen as a continuation of Russia's irredentism at the expense of Ukraine.[25] Parallels were made between Putin's irredentism during the Ukrainian War and Slobodan Milosevic's irredentism during the Bosnian War.[26]

On 1 March 2022, images emerged in the press showing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in front of a map which appeared to show invasion plans for Moldova where Russia already has soldiers in the breakaway region of Transnistria.[27][28] South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov announced his intention to begin the process of annexation by the Russian Federation.[29]

On 8 June 2022, a draft bill was submitted to Russia's State Duma by a member of the ruling United Russia party proposing to repeal the Decree of the State Council of the Soviet Union "On the Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of Lithuania".[30][31][32] On 6 July, the speaker of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, threatened to "claim back" Alaska if the US froze or seized Russian assets.[33]

In September 2022, referendums on joining Russia were held in four Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine: the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, Zaporizhzhia region and Kherson region. The Russian occupation authorities announced that all regions had overwhelmingly voted in favor of joining Russia and that there had been a high turnout despite the ongoing war. It was widely dismissed as a sham referendum by Ukraine and many other countries.[34][35] On 30 September, Putin announced in a speech[36] that Russia had annexed the four regions.[37]

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former Russian president, said that Ukraine should not exist in any form and that Russia will continue to wage war against any independent Ukrainian state.[38] He commented that Putin outlined "why Ukraine did not exist, does not exist, and will not exist".[39] According to Medvedev, Ukrainian capital Kyiv is a "Russian city" and that "we have long desired Odesa in the Russian Federation. Even by virtue of the history of this city, the kind of people who live there, the language they speak, it is our Russian city."[40][41]

Critical analysis of Russian irredentism and international reactions[edit]

On 12 October 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution ES 11/4 declaring that the staged referendums and attempted annexation are invalid and illegal under international law.
  In favour: 143
  Against: 5
  Abstained: 35
  Absent: 10

Some Russian nationalists seek to annex parts of the "near abroad", such as the Baltic states.[42] Governor of the Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Yevgeny Balitsky has described how "all of the Baltics" were "all our lands, and our people live there," calling to "correct this...through the might of Russian weapons" and "get our people back, the former subjects of the Russian Empire".[43] Others also some fear potential escalation due to Russian irredentist aspirations in Northern Kazakhstan.[44]

Looking at the Russian efforts as a whole, the news network Al Jazeera has quoted University of San Francisco scholar Stephen Zunes as remarking, "The level of physical devastation and casualties thus far over a relatively short period is perhaps the [worst] in recent decades which, combined with the irredentist aims of the conquest, makes Russia's war on Ukraine particularly reprehensible in the eyes of the international community."[2]

U.S. news publication The Washington Post has stated that the Russian government could start a chain reaction of irredentist mass violence, which then "could break the international order".[45]

These annexations and irredentist aspirations were declared illegal by the UN. On 12 October 2022, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution ES-11/4 advocating for territorial integrity of Ukraine, with 143 nations voting in favor, 5 against and 35 abstaining. It condemned the "illegal so-called referendums" and the "attempted illegal annexation" and demanded that Russia immediately reverse its decisions and withdraw its forces from Ukraine.[46]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ The state expanded eastwards, westwards and southwards, which led to the conquests of Siberia, the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Uzbekistan.

References[edit]

  1. ^ Nagle, John (8 May 2014). "Russia's nationalist quest risks future of European borders". The Conversation.
  2. ^ a b "Can Russia return to the world stage, as other aggressor nations?". Al Jazeera. 29 March 2022. Retrieved 7 April 2022.
  3. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 96.
  4. ^ Tristan James Mabry; John McGarry; Margaret Moore; Brendan O'Leary (2013). Divided Nations and European Integration: National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 365. ISBN 9780812244977.
  5. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 197.
  6. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 199.
  7. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 196.
  8. ^ "Vladimir Putin: Russia's border 'doesn't end anywhere'". BBC News. 24 November 2016. Retrieved 19 June 2023.
  9. ^ Armando Navarro (2015). Mexicano and Latino Politics and the Quest for Self-Determination: What Needs to Be Done. Lexington Books. p. 536. ISBN 9780739197363.
  10. ^ Joseph J. Hobbs (2016). Fundamentals of World Regional Geography. Cengage Learning. p. 183. ISBN 9781305854956.
  11. ^ Marvin Kalb (2015). Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War. Brookings Institution Press. p. 163. ISBN 9780815727446.
  12. ^ Stephen Saideman (March 18, 2014). "Why Crimea is likely the limit of Greater Russia". The Globe and Mail.
  13. ^ Bocharova, Svetlana; Biryukova, Liliya (18 March 2014). "Приднестровье как Крым" [Transnistria as Crimea]. Vedomosti (in Russian). Archived from the original on 11 December 2021. Retrieved 8 June 2021.
  14. ^ "Moldova's Trans-Dniester region pleads to join Russia". BBC. 18 March 2014.
  15. ^ "Transnistria wants to merge with Russia". Vestnik Kavkaza. 18 March 2014.
  16. ^ Casey Michael (19 June 2015). "Pew Survey: Irredentism Alive and Well in Russia". The Diplomat.
  17. ^ Vladimir Socor. "Putin's Crimea Speech: A Manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism". Vol. 11, no. 56. Eurasia Daily Monitor.
  18. ^ "Russian-backed 'Novorossiya' breakaway movement collapses". Ukraine Today. 20 May 2015.
    Vladimir Dergachev; Dmitriy Kirillov (20 May 2015). Проект «Новороссия» закрыт [Project "New Russia" is closed]. Gazeta.ru (in Russian).
  19. ^ "Why the Kremlin Is Shutting Down the Novorossiya Project". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2015-12-20.
  20. ^ Düben, B A. "Revising History and ‘Gathering the Russian Lands’: Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian Nationhood". LSE Public Policy Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 2023
  21. ^ "Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians"". President of Russia. 12 July 2021. Retrieved 2022-11-04.
  22. ^ Jack, Victor; Busvine, Douglas (22 February 2022). "Putin recognizes separatist claims to Ukraine's entire Donbass region". Politico. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  23. ^ Borger, Julian; Roth, Andrew (22 February 2022). "Russia strongly condemned at UN after Putin orders troops into eastern Ukraine". The Guardian. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  24. ^ "Ukraine conflict: Russian forces attack after Putin TV declaration". BBC News. 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  25. ^ Paul Hensel, Sara Mitchell, Andrew Owsiak (March 4, 2022). "Russian irredentist claims are a threat to global peace". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 31, 2022.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  26. ^ Harun Karcic (March 30, 2022). "Why NATO Should Worry About the Balkans". The Economist. Retrieved March 31, 2022. The similarities between Russian and Serbian irredentism are astonishing. Back in the 1990s, Serbian nationalists parroted the claim that Bosnia historically belonged to Serbia, that we Bosniak Muslims were in fact Christian Serbs who were forcefully converted to Islam under the Ottomans, and that Bosnia—as an independent and sovereign country—would not survive without Serbian tutelage. So closely are Bosniak Muslims able to identify with Ukrainians that monetary donations have been collected and prayers held at Bosnian mosques for Ukraine's defense.
  27. ^ Mitchell, Ellen (2022-03-01). "Belarus president stands in front of map indicating Moldova invasion plans". The Hill. Retrieved 2022-10-21.
  28. ^ "Belarus leader may have inadvertently revealed Russian invasion map on TV". The Independent. 2022-03-02. Retrieved 2022-10-21.
  29. ^ "Breakaway Georgian Region Seeks to Be Putin's Next Annexation". Bloomberg. Bloomberg News. 30 March 2022. Retrieved 30 March 2022.
  30. ^ Новости, Р. И. А. (2022-06-08). "Депутат Федоров предложил отозвать признание независимости Литвы". РИА Новости (in Russian). Retrieved 2022-11-21.
  31. ^ Peseckyte, Giedre (2022-06-09). "Russian Duma questions Lithuania's independence". www.euractiv.com. Retrieved 2022-11-21.
  32. ^ Cole, Brendan (2022-06-09). "Russia Mulls Lithuania's 'Illegal' Independence From Moscow". Newsweek. Retrieved 2022-11-21.
  33. ^ Russian House Speaker Threatens to ‘Take Back’ Alaska
  34. ^ Trevelyan, Mark (28 September 2022). "Moscow's proxies in occupied Ukraine regions report big votes to join Russia". Reuters.
  35. ^ "Kremlin announces vote, paves way to annex part of Ukraine". Associated Press. 27 September 2022.
  36. ^ "Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia". Kremlin.
  37. ^ "Putin says Russia has 'four new regions' as he announces annexation of Ukrainian territory". Reuters. 30 September 2022. Archived from the original on 30 September 2022. Retrieved 30 September 2022.
  38. ^ "Putin Ally Says There's '100 Percent' Chance of Future Russia-Ukraine Wars". Newsweek. 17 January 2024.
  39. ^ Luxmoore, Matthew (9 February 2024). "What Did Putin Gain From Sitting Down With Tucker Carlson?". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 23 February 2024.
  40. ^ "Medvedev says Kyiv is a "Russian city" and threatens to "take it back"". Ukrainska Pravda, Yahoo!. 20 November 2022.
  41. ^ Balachuk, Iryna (22 February 2024). "Russia's former president claims Russia will take Kyiv, and that the conquest of Odesa has "long been desired" in Russia". Ukrainska Pravda.
  42. ^ William Maley (1995). "Does Russia Speak for Baltic Russians?". The World Today. 51 (1): 4–6. JSTOR 40396641.
  43. ^ Cole, Brendan (5 October 2023). "Russian Official Proposes Invading Five NATO Countries". Newsweek. Retrieved 5 October 2023.
  44. ^ C. Diener, Alexander (2015). "Assessing potential Russian irredentism and separatism in Kazakhstan's northern oblasts". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 56 (5): 469–492. doi:10.1080/15387216.2015.1103660. S2CID 155953187.
  45. ^ "Russia's land grabs in Ukraine could break the international order". The Washington Post. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2022.
  46. ^ "Ukraine: UN General Assembly demands Russia reverse course on 'attempted illegal annexation'". UN News. 12 October 2022. Retrieved 19 June 2023.

Sources[edit]

  • Saideman, Stephen M.; Ayres, William R. (2008), For Kin Or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War, Columbia University Press

Further reading[edit]